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Guest Editorial
Corporate Governance and the 2008–09
Financial Crisis
Martin Conyon, William Q. Judge, and Michael Useem
ABSTRACT
The ﬁnancial crisis of the late 2000s resulted in enormous costs to the economies of many countries and the fortunes of
millions of families, and it challenged a host of our conceptions and theories of corporate governance. The governing boards
of many ﬁnancial-services ﬁrms seemed unable to prevent the risky and ill-fated decisions that jeopardized their ﬁrms,
devastated their investors, and helped precipitate a ﬁnancial meltdown that morphed into global recession. Company
boards were also directly responsible through their compensation committees and consultant advisors for a sharp rise in
executive compensation during the 2000s that may have contributed to undue short-term risk-taking among the ﬁnancialservice companies that helped spark the recession. The macroeconomic environment also changed. Historically low interest
rates, and the development of new ways of ﬁnancing mortgage products led to an irrationally exuberant mind-set of lending
and borrowing in the housing market. The quality of some loans was questionable, but home asset prices continued to
increase – until they collapsed in 2008. The boom and bust in the housing market was an important contributor – one of
many including inadequate corporate governance – to the perfect ﬁnancial storm of 2008–09.
From a conference with 87 papers on the role of corporate governance in precipitating or exacerbating the ﬁnancial crisis,
and from ﬁve articles by governance researchers and three articles by prominent governance participant-observers included
in this special issue, it is evident that governance played a contributing role. An article by Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn ﬁnds
that directors of sub-prime lenders compared with other lenders served on a larger number of other company boards,
presumably allowing then less time to monitor the sub-prime lender’s risky practices, and they served for fewer years on
the sub-prime lender’s board, suggesting that they were less experienced in evaluating the ﬁnancial risks of the sub-prime
markets. A second article by Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, and Xu report that the higher the levels of debt held by banks, a
policy presumably monitored and approved by directors, the lower bank ﬁnancial and operating performance during the
ﬁnancial crisis. A third article by Yeh, Liu, and Chung ﬁnds that director independence on the auditing and risk management committees affected risk taking behaviors and subsequent performance.
In the pursuit of productive avenues for reform, a fourth article Pirson and Turnbull argue for a network of boards
representing multiple constituencies, convened through a “stakeholder congress,” that would bring more sources of
information to the attention of more actors who could make more effective use of the information in guiding company risk
management. A ﬁfth article by Nicholson, Kiel, and Kiel-Chisholm argue for the re-establishment of professional restraints
and creation of a new set of more responsible social norms within the ﬁnancial sector to avoid the next ﬁnancial meltdown.
Three well-informed participant observers corroborate these ﬁndings and direct special attention to both company and
country governance issues at they help foster the ﬁnancial meltdown. Berglöf ﬁnds that the absence of both micro and macro
protections against excessive and systemic risk may have opened the way for the perfect storm. Feinberg concludes that
distortions from economically-rational pay practices – ultimately the responsibility of the board – may have contributed to
the ﬁnancial crisis as executives sought to optimize their pay in ways that were not optimal for the ﬁrm nor its investors,
customers, or lenders. Johnson places some of the blame for the crisis indirectly on the governance door step – directors who
hired and monitored the bankers at center of the crisis had helped foster a culture of short-term greed and narrow
self-interest that became toxic when it became systemic and no longer limited to a few aberrant players.
Taken together, the ﬁve articles and three commentaries in this issue point to the importance and interplay of both micro
and macro governance factors in contributing to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09 – and to the importance of reforming those
factors to help avert another ﬁnancial crisis in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

T

he ﬁnancial crisis of the late 2000s resulted in enormous
costs to the economies of many countries and the fortunes of millions of families. Triggered by a real estate
bubble, overly leveraged ﬁnancial products, and failures of
AIG, Lehman, Merrill, and other major ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the
“Great Recession” of 2008–09 saw America’s GDP contract
by more than 4 per cent and that of some countries by
double digits. US unemployment doubled, international
trade plummeted, and by March 2009 the Dow Jones Industrial Average had declined by 54 per cent from its peak just
17 months before, wiping out trillions of dollars of wealth
from the stock market. Modest, though unsteady, recovery
came to most economies in 2010–11, stimulated in part, by
direct government intervention by China, the European
Union, the United States, and elsewhere.
The worldwide economic crisis challenged a host of our
conceptions and theories of corporate governance. The
American governance tradition, fortiﬁed by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 and the New York Stock Exchange’s
revised rules of 2003, had emphasized strong outsiderdominated boards with independent audit, compensation,
and governance committees. Despite the strengthened regulatory regime in the United States and a comparatively
strong focus on shareholder monitoring, the governing
boards of many American ﬁnancial-services ﬁrms proved
unable to prevent the risky and ill-fated decisions that jeopardized their ﬁrms, devastated their investors, and helped
precipitate a ﬁnancial meltdown that morphed into global
recession. Company boards were also directly responsible
through their compensation committees for a sharp rise in
executive compensation during the 2000s. Some critics
viewed the growth in compensation as contributing to
excessive short-term risk-taking among the ﬁnancial-service
companies, and that in turn helped spark the recession. The
precise causes of the global ﬁnancial crisis will occupy the
minds of academics for years to come.
The governance shortcomings that may have contributed
to the ﬁnancial crisis were not uniquely American, however,
with companies in many countries evidently adding their
own governance deﬁciencies to the crisis. Iceland’s three
major commercial banks collapsed, plunging the country
into recession. The British government bailed out and effectively nationalized Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of
Scotland as their boards’ ineffective risk oversight and the
banks’ exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market led to
insolvency. Switzerland’s UBS reported a loss of $17 billion
in 2008, the largest in Swiss company history, writing down
some $50 billion in mortgage assets, losses precipitated in
part because of weak governance at the top (UBS, 2009).
Many complex and interdependent forces led to the
largest economic crisis since the Great Depression of the
1930s, and corporate governance systems were arguably
one of the contributing factors. One issue that many
company leaders attending the annual meeting of the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January,
2009, near the peak of the ﬁnancial crisis, could agree upon
was that national corporate governance systems were not
working properly (Useem, 2009). While corporate governance may or may not be a root cause of the economic
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crisis, most informed observers do not hold it blameless.
There is little agreement, however, on what precisely was
wrong with governance and accordingly what steps are
needed to set put matters right.
To help ﬁll that gap, Mauro Guillen, William Judge, and
Michael Useem organized a research conference on “Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis” held at the
Wharton School on September 24–25, 2010. The conference
was co-sponsored by Corporate Governance: An International
Review, the journal’s publisher Wiley-Blackwell, Penn
Lauder CIBER of the Lauder Institute of the University of
Pennsylvania, and the Wharton Center for Leadership and
Change Management. Researchers from around the globe
submitted 133 paper summaries for inclusion in the conference, they delivered 87 papers at the conference (authors
and titles are available at http://gfc.wharton.upenn.edu/
schedule.shtml), and ﬁve of the most compelling studies are
included in this special issue. The special issue was edited by
Martin Conyon, William Judge, and Michael Useem.
The conference papers and issue articles addressed two
central and related thematic questions. First, did corporate
governance play a contributing role in precipitating or exacerbating the ﬁnancial crisis in the US and other countries?
Second, what public policy and corporate governance
reforms are required in light of what we have learned from
the ﬁnancial crisis? Among the speciﬁc research issues and
policy measures addressed by the papers and the conference
were:
• Empowering shareholders to exercise greater inﬂuence
on corporate boards.
• Instituting new rules and regulations to strengthen risk
management.
• Separating the roles of board chair and chief executive.
• Emphasizing stronger norms of director responsibility
and self-regulation.
• Preventing ﬁnancial institutions from becoming “too big
to govern.”
• Overhauling credit-rating and ﬁnancial reporting to
better signal risk.
While there were clearly breakdowns in “public” governance systems, the ﬁve articles included in this issue conﬁrm
that speciﬁc features of corporate governance did indeed
contribute to the ﬁnancial crisis, and the articles also
develop arguments that company directors require better
information and improved codes of behavior if they are to
help avert excessive risk taking in the future. The articles in
this special issue represent important steps in understanding the relation between corporate governance systems and
the global ﬁnancial crisis.

DID CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PLAY A ROLE?
Three of the special issue’s articles offer direct evidence that
governance shortcomings served as contributing if not originating factors in the ﬁnancial crisis. Taken together, their
speciﬁc ﬁndings conﬁrm that distinct features of governance
did make a difference, and they did so in consistent and
predictable ways. In that consistency and predictability are
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implications for company practices and country policies for
guarding against undue systemic risks in the future.
In our lead article, Maureen Muller-Kahle and Krista
Lewellyn compared American ﬁnancial ﬁrms that engaged
in sub-prime mortgage lending with a matched set of ﬁnancial ﬁrms that did not so engage during the period from 1997
to 2005. The contrast is particularly apt for thinking about
the ﬁnancial crisis since we know from other observers that
overly risky sub-prime mortgage practices were at the heart
of the 2008–09 ﬁnancial crisis (e.g., Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy,
2010). The comparison was made possible by the US Department of Housing Urban Development’s practice of identifying sub-prime specialists prior to 2006, deﬁning a specialist
as a lender with more than half its portfolio in subprime
loans. Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn ﬁnd that directors of subprime lenders served on a larger number of other company
boards, presumably allowing them less time to monitor the
sub-prime lender’s risky practices, and they served for
fewer years on the sub-prime lender’s board, suggesting that
they were less experienced in evaluating the ﬁnancial risks of
the sub-prime markets. These strategic management scholars also discovered that the governing boards of the subprime lenders were less diverse in gender, potentially
signifying that the sub-prime boards were less likely to challenge the growing wisdom in this period that sub-prime
leading was a worthy long-term strategy. The results point to
the importance of company practices and public policies that
encourage engaged, informed, and diverse dialogue within
the boardroom to better protect against unwarranted risk
taking behavior.
The second article in this special issue also focused on US
ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and it was authored by Hugh Grove, Lorenzo
Patelli, Lisa Victoravich, and Pisun (Tracy) Xu. Speciﬁcally,
these accounting and ﬁnance scholars seek to understand if
there is a systematic relationship between governance structures and subsequent performance outcomes for a set of 236
publicly-traded American commercial banks prior to and
during the ﬁnancial crisis. In this study, the authors focus on
accounting, market, and operational-based performance
outcomes. This comprehensive study examines 11 different
ﬁrm-level governance factors stemming from agency theory
to explain performance outcomes in ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Interestingly, only a few governance factors were signiﬁcant and in
the predicted direction. As such, this raises questions about
structural causes and solutions to governance problems.
However, one of the most robust empirical ﬁndings was that
the higher levels of debt held by banks, the lower their
overall ﬁnancial and operating performance during the
ﬁnancial crisis. While this ﬁnding is counter to standard
agency arguments whereby debt holders are incentivized to
monitor more closely, it does suggest some very important
practical implications for minimum capital requirements
and maximum leverage ratios for banks in the aftermath of
the ﬁnancial meltdown.
In the third article on the effect of corporate governance on
the crisis within the ﬁnancial sector, Yin-Hua Yeh, Liang Liu,
and Huimin Chung focus on the relationship between
banking committee structures and subsequent ﬁrm performance of the 20 largest ﬁnancial institutions from 11 major
economies. Using a unique, hand-collected database of multinational ﬁrms, these ﬁnance scholars ﬁnd that director
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independence on the auditing and risk management committees were systematically related to risk taking behaviors
and subsequent ﬁrm performance. However, director independence on the compensation and nominating committees
was not so related, according to this study. Because of their
cross-national sample, the authors also explored the inﬂuence of national context on the committee independenceﬁrm performance relationship. In sum, this study suggests
that additional research at the committee level may be
insightful along with study of overall board-level structures
and behaviors.

WHAT REFORMS ARE REQUIRED?
The results of these three research articles point to the speciﬁc governance reforms that would discourage the excessive risk taking among ﬁnancial institutions that arguably
contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis if not constituting a root
cause of it. These include fostering governing boards whose
directors are independent, engaged, informed, and diverse,
especially in countries whose regulatory regimes provide
weaker protection of shareholder rights.
Two additional articles in the special issue identify
reforms that go well beyond a focus on changing the composition or organization of the governing board, the locus
of much of the debate to date. The ﬁrst article investigates
the power of information on company risk and the governance failings that are likely in the absence of good information. The second references the power of governance
norms and the governance failings that are probable when
those norms are misdirected. These two articles explore
important and underappreciated features of governance
that may have played a subtle but powerful role in precipitating the ﬁnancial crisis.
In the ﬁrst of the two articles, management and governance specialists Michael Pirson and Shann Turnbull
explore the role of information asymmetries within the
boardroom in creating unreasonable systemic risk. To help
rectify the information deﬁcits that afﬂict most boards,
Pirson and Turnbull call for a more complex governing
structure. Speciﬁcally, they argue for a network of boards
representing multiple constituencies, convened through a
“stakeholder congress,” that would bring more sources of
information to the attention of more actors who could make
more effective use of the information in guiding company
risk management. If ﬁrms are not prepared to voluntarily
move from their current unitary structure toward more networked governance, argue the authors, national regulators
should step in to require it.
In the second of the two reform articles, Gavin Nicholson,
Geoffrey Kiel, and Scott Kiel-Chisholm argue for the
re-establishment of professional responsibility within the
ﬁnancial sector to avoid the next ﬁnancial meltdown. Speciﬁcally, they argue that no structural change can adequately
avert future ﬁnancial crises without commensurate attention
to the social norms that surround proper ﬁnancial transactions. Hence, the norm of caveat emptor – buyer beware – is
problematic when the complexity of ﬁnancial products
becomes too great to readily assess. Similarly, the norm of
self-interested behavior needs to be challenged when the
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entire ﬁnancial system is put at risk. While Nicholson, Kiel,
and Kiel-Chisholm, specialists in accounting, law, and management, acknowledge the difﬁculty of changing social
norms within societies, their arguments are appealing in
light of the experience of national economies that weathered
the crisis in relatively good fashion, such as those of Canada
and Scandinavia, where social norms evidently helped avert
the crisis.

MICRO AND MACRO GOVERNANCE
The conference organizers also invited three prominent governance participant-observers to present their own assessments of the role of governance in the ﬁnancial crisis. Their
commentaries, included in this issue, corroborate and reinforce the ﬁndings and conclusions of the ﬁve articles, but
they also go beyond them to emphasize looking at both
company and country governance issues at they fostered the
ﬁnancial meltdown.
The three participant-observers bring substantial practical
and academic experience in corporate governance to their
observations on the crisis:
Erik Berglöf. Chief Economist and Special Adviser to the
President at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Served as director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics; professor at the Stockholm
School of Economics; senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; founder and president of the Center for Economic
and Financial Research, Moscow; board member and
research fellow for the European Corporate Governance
Institute; advisor to national governments, International
Monetary Fund, and World Bank.
Kenneth R. Feinberg. Managing partner of Feinberg
Rozen, LLP. Served as US-appointed administrator of the
BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim Compensation
Fund; Special Master for Executive Compensation for
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) companies;
Special Master of the Federal September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund; Fund Administrator for the Hokie
Spirit Memorial Fund following the shootings at Virginia
Tech University; adjunct professor at the law schools of
University of Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, and
Columbia University.
Simon Johnson. Professor of Entrepreneurship at MIT
Sloan School of Management, and author of 13 Bankers:
The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown
(2010); senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics; member of the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce’s Panel of Economic Advisers; formerly
Economic Counselor (chief economist), International
Monetary Fund; former member of US Securities and
Exchange Commission’s Advisory Committee on
Market Information.
Drawing on his European experience along with that in
the US, Erik Berglöf emphasizes looking at both the “micro”
governance system and the “macro” governance framework
– governance at the ﬁrm level versus governance at the
country level. He argues that we should consistently con-
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sider their joint impact and the possibility that weaknesses at
one level might be compensated at the other level. If not, it
may be a prescription for a perfect ﬁnancial storm.
Focusing ﬁrst on the micro level, Berglöf observes that
governing boards in Europe are more under the inﬂuence of
founding families and large banks than in the United States,
where stockholding by contrast is relatively dispersed
among a large number of institutional investors, resulting in
what has been termed a “strong manager-weak owner” syndrome (Roe, 1996). Without powerful principals monitoring
their ﬁrms, and without a strong macro-governance system
to make up for this micro-weakness, it is not surprising that
the ﬁnancial crisis originated in the US. The absence of both
micro and macro protections – too few vigilant owners and
bankers and too little regulatory vigilance of the banks –
may have opened the way for the storm.
But Berglöf remains agnostic on whether corporate governance shortcomings were a root cause of the calamity,
noting that the crisis had hit banks in several countries with
considerably differing systems of micro and macro governance. Moreover, some of the what are often taken to be
good micro-governance practices – such as ensuring that
directors and executives are riveted on creating shareholder
value and meeting the demands of investors – may (ironically) have actually contributed to the crisis as some banks
were inadvertently driven by their investors and directors to
take unwarranted risks in the home mortgage market in the
name of increasing near-term shareholder returns.
There are even indications, Berglöf notes, that purportedly
good macro-governance practices – such as regulators’ inﬂuence over director nominations to banking boards – may
have inadvertently resulted in the placement of less qualiﬁed
directors on the boards of banks. Also ironic is the fact that
ﬁnancial institutions in the emerging markets such as China
and India weathered the crisis better than ﬁrms in the developed markets where corporate governance in both micro
and macro forms is often viewed as better designed and
implemented.
On reviewing these disparate and sometimes contradictory strands of evidence, Berglöf concludes that there is too
little evidence at the moment to conclude that corporate
governance practices alone constituted a consistent and signiﬁcant cross-national cause of the ﬁnancial meltdown.
For his assessment of the ﬁnancial crisis, Kenneth Feinberg draws on his direct experience as the US Special Master
for Executive Compensation under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program provisions that mandated government review of
the 25 highest paid executives of the seven companies that
received the largest amount of taxpayer assistance – AIG,
Bank of America, Chrysler, Chrysler Financial, Citigroup,
General Motors, and GMAC. In reviewing and then setting
compensation for the 175 executives of these companies,
Feinberg learned that executive demand for very high levels
of pay was very strong, even though in his assessment and
that of his compensation consultants, the executives’ performance did not merit the millions of dollars they were
demanding.
To more closely connect pay to performance, Feinberg
established a set of six principles to guide the seven companies’ compensation practices, including the requirement of
payouts over several years and prohibiting special perqui-
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sites, golden parachutes, and retirement packages. In other
words, he found that he had to impose on companies what
good governance practices would generally suggest – primarily tying executive rewards to long-term company performance – despite company pressures to the contrary. His
“prescriptions,” he reported “did not go unchallenged,”
with “strong arguments” coming from the companies that
his such provisions would be “counterproductive.”
Feinberg’s direct immersion in the world of executive
compensation thus points to company distortions from
economically-rational pay practices – ultimately the responsibility of the board – that may have contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis as executives sought to optimize their pay in ways
that were not optimal for the ﬁrm nor its investors, customers, or lenders. Feinberg, like Berglöf, remained unsure if
company pay practices contributed signiﬁcantly to the crisis,
but based on his close and unprecedented look at the pay
practices of a set of large companies and the norms that
supported the practices, he became convinced that there is a
“connection.” By implication, the prevailing norms of the
governing board regarding executive pay is one area ripe for
research and reform to discourage though not necessarily
prevent future ﬁnancial crises.
From his extensive policy and research experience, Simon
Johnson reaches a pessimistic assessment regarding the
capacity of governance reforms to help avert future ﬁnancial
crises. He argues that that we still do not know what factors,
including corporate governance, really caused or exacerbated the crisis of 2008–09. And as a result, the next crisis
may well be worse than that of 2008–09 because the ﬁnancial
institutions from which it emanated are becoming bigger
than ever and thus more vulnerable to systemic risks. We
may be moving from a policy-intervention era of “too big to
fail” to a policy-impervious era of “too big to save.” And this
despite alleged modest regulatory reforms, some touching
on corporate governance, in the Dodd-Franks act of 2010. We
had, Johnson argues, “weakened the levies” in earlier years
by “dismantling” banking regulations, thereby reducing
oversight of banking in ways that allow for abuses of customers and short-term advantages that impose longer-term
systemic risks, and these macro governance shortcomings
remain unaddressed.”
Still, Johnson places some of the proximate blame for the
ﬁnancial crisis indirectly on the governance door step. Just 13
top bankers were, in his view, “largely, but not completely,
responsible for what had happened.” And behind them, or
above them, the directors who had hired and supervised
those bankers had an indirect hand in creating a culture of
short-term greed and narrow self-interest that became toxic
when it became systemic and no longer limited to a few
aberrant players. No banker’s employment contract had
required them, for instance, to “be responsible for the ﬁnancial stability in the United States.” As a result, Johnson
observed, for bankers the “incentive is to get in, make
money, take risk, perhaps to misunderstand risk, perhaps to
misrepresent risk, perhaps to work with other people who
do not understand risk.” And since executive compensation
and excessive risk are the province of directors, the board is
indirectly to blame for the failure of ﬁnancial institutions to
adequately govern their own risks. Johnson implicitly places
his bets more on the macro than micro side of the aisle,
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choosing to call for more national regulation than board
reform. With more of the ﬁrst – such as higher capital
requirements for banks – more of the second should follow.

CONCLUSION
The commentaries of the three informed observers who
were directly involved with the crisis reinforce the ﬁndings
of the ﬁve research-based articles included in this issue.
They collectively point to the importance and interplay of
both micro and macro governance factors in contributing to
the ﬁnancial crisis and to the importance of reforming them
to help avert a future ﬁnancial crisis.
While this conference and special issue was not intended
to settle the issue of whether corporate governance played a
major or minor role in this record-breaking crisis, the
thoughtful commentaries and careful studies suggest that
company boards at least failed to avert or limit the systemic
damage and should thus be seen as a potential target for
reforms to prevent future ﬁnancial crises. This conclusion is
not to imply that political systems and public governance
should be viewed as blameless, and attention to their reform
is certainly in order as well.
The precise causes of the global ﬁnancial crisis will be
hotly debated for decades. Many experts point to “regulatory capture” of Washington by Wall Street as the underlying cause of the crisis (e.g., Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Johnson
& Kwak, 2010; Krugman, 2009). Others single out the pernicious role of greed and compensation practices that ignored
the excessive risks incurred (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Rajan, 2010;
Sorkin, 2009). Still others stress cultural, network, and social
factors (Davis, 2009; Loungsbury & Hirsch, 2010). Regardless of the root causes, corporate governance mechanisms
external to and within ﬁnancial institutions failed to avoid
and adequately cope with the crisis as it unfolded.
An emerging consensus suggests that many other factors
contributed to the risk-taking that led to the ﬁnancial crisis.
These include implicit government guarantees that helped
create a too-big-to-fail culture, questionable monetary policies, and ill-advised ﬁnancial innovations and products such
as mortgage securitizations and collateralized debt obligations. With post-crisis analysis, it now appears that the
2008–09 calamity emerged from the conditions of a perfect
storm, a rare combination of a host of contributing forces,
none of which was enough to cause the crisis, but together
were enough to generate the crisis.
One of those many contributing factors, for example, was
the emergence of an overly exuberant mind-set within the
home-mortgage banking community. In a study of mortgage
lending from 2001 to 2006, Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011) found that issuers increasingly provided low-quality
mortgages and that mortgage loan-to-value ratios increased
while loan documentation decreased. As more home loans
were given to buyers with poor credit ratings, buyers
proved far less able to meet their obligations and their delinquency rates sharply rose. In short, as the home-mortgage
market became increasingly willing to offer high-risk loans
and as delinquency-prone individuals became more willing
to accept them, a classic boom and bust cycle emerged,
creating a housing bubble that proved an important factor –
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though one of many including inadequate corporate governance – that ultimately coalesced into the perfect ﬁnancial
storm of 2008–09.
Going forward, a more complete understanding of the
multiple causes of the ﬁnancial crisis at the ﬁrm level
requires further research and analysis of the relations among
governance practices, risk management, loan policies, and
capital structures. At the macro level, it requires further
study of how regulatory frameworks in an array of countries
can help better ensure that directors and executives of
ﬁnancial-service ﬁrms take risks that that are neither excessive nor systemic. In this regard it is essential to amass
further empirical evidence. This will enable policy makers
assign weights to which factors were most salient in triggering the ﬁnancial crisis. We hope that the articles in this
special issue helps contribute to that understanding, and we
encourage further scholarly study of the distinctive role of
governance in the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09 to help
ensure that we both move beyond the calamity and prevent
its recurrence.
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